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Summary  findings
In South Africa unions, which played a crucial role in the  They find that African nonunion workers who are
country's transition from apartheid, are coming under  covered by industrial council agreements receive a
fire. Some argue that a high union wage premium and  premium of 6 to 10 percent; the premium is positive but
the industrial council system are important  causes of  not statistically significant for whites.
inflexibility in South Africa's labor market.  In addition, the union gap is smaller inside the
Butcher and Rouse analyze unions'  direct effect on  industrial council system than outside the system for
workers' wages (including the time-honored question  Africans, implying that the total union premium for
about whether  the union wage gap is real or reflects the  union members covered by an industrial council
fact that workers who are members of unions differ from  agreement is similar to the union premium outside the
those who are not) and ask whether  there is evidence  industrial council system.
that industrial council agreements force affected  Among Africans, the industrial council and union wage
employers to pay union wages for nonunion workers.  gaps are greatest among low-wage workers.
They estimate that among Africans union members  To increase employment, policies in South Africa
earn about 20 percent more than nonmembers, while  should focus on increasing competition among
among whites union workers earn 10 percent more than  employers within sectors, rather than increasing compe-
nonunion workers.  tition among workers by trying to reduce union power.
This paper-a  product of Poverty and Human Resources, Development Research Group-is  part of a larger effort in the
group to understand the impact of labor market policies and institutions on economic performance. The study was funded
by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "The Impact of Labor Market Policies and Institutions
on Economic Performance" (RPO 680-96). Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Patricia Sader, mail stop MC3-306, telephone 202-473-3902, fax 202-522-1153,
email address psader@worldbank. org. Policy  Research Working Papers  are also posted on the Web at www.worldbank. orgl
research/workingpapers.  The authors  may be contacted  at kbutcher@macfound.org  or rouse@princeton.edu.  January
2001.  (47 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  oC  work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development issues.  An objective of the series is to get the findings out  quickly, even if the presentations  are less  than  fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should toe  cited accordingly.  The findings, interpretations, and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper are entirely those of the autbors. They  do not necessarily represent  the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countnies  they represent.
Produced  by the Policy  Research  Dissemination  CenterWage Effects of Unions and Industrial Councils in South Africa
Kristin F. Butcher
Boston College (on leave) and The MacArthur Foundation
Cecilia Elena Rouse
Princeton  University  and NBER
We thank Orley Ashenfelter, Anne Case, Sam Bowles, Angus Deaton, Hank Farber, Rob Jensen,
Stephan Klasen, Alan  Krueger, Peter Moll, Martin Rama, T.  Paul  Schultz, Francis Wilson,
participants in the development seminar at Princeton University, the Cornell-Princeton policy
conference,  and the World Bank for very helpful comments. Tiziana Brancaccio provided helpful
research assistance. We are particularly indebted to Shane Godfrey who lent us his personal copy
of the Industrial Council Digest. This paper is part of the World Bank research project on The
Impact of Labor Market Policies and Institutions on Economic  Performance. The views expressed
here are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the World Bank or the MacArthur
Foundation.  We thank the Industrial Relations Section at Princeton University for additional
support.Abstract
Some argue that a high union wage premium and the industrial council system are important
causes of inflexibility  in the South  African labor market. We estimate union premia on the order of
20 percent for African workers and  10 percent for White workers.  We also find that African
nonunion workers who are covered by industrial council agreements receive a premium of 6-10
percent; the premium is positive but not statistically significant for Whites.  In addition, although
the union gap is smaller inside of the industrial council system than outside of the system for
Africans, the total union premium for union members covered by an industrial council agreement
is similar to the union premium outside of the industrial council system.  Among Africans, the
industrial council and union wage gaps are largest among low wage workers.
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Unions played a crucial role in South Africa's historic transition from the apartheid era.
Now, however, they are coming under fire as major contributors  to inflexibility  in the South African
labor market.  Some argue that an unusually high union wage premium and highly centralized
collective bargaining are important causes of this inflexibility (Boccara and Moll 1997).  As of
1994, about 33 percent of Africans employed in the formal sector belonged to unions, as did 23
percent of Whites. And, by one estimate, among Africans, union members earn 60 percent more
than nonunion workers, on average (Schultz and Mwabu 1998).  This union premium is not
necessarily limited to union members, for the cornerstone  of collective  bargaining in South Africa,
the  industrial  council  system,  operates  under  "ergo  omnes"  rules  which  extend  union  wage
agreements to nonunion workers (Bendix 1989).  Critics claim that the rigidity of the collective
bargaining system places a special burden on small employers, increases business failures and
discourages start-ups, and contributes to South Africa's extremely high unemployment  rate.I
Others argue  that recent estimates  of the union wage premium are implausibly  high and the
fact that unions garner a wage premium for their workers does not necessarily mean they are
responsible  for inflexibility  in the South African  labor market.  Although the centralized  bargaining
system does, in theory, allow union agreements to be extended to nonunion workers, in practice
parties are often granted  exemptions  from them (Sender,  and Weeks 1996). In addition,  wage premia
earned by African workers have widespread benefits because each African worker tends to support
By some estimates,  the unemployment  rate is as high as 30 percent overall (Fallon  and Lucas
1996, Simkins 1997, Klasen and Woolard 1999), and a plurality of unemployed Africans
under age 35 have never held a formal job (Baskin 1997).many individuals who are not working.2
In this paper we address two key issues necessary  to help disentangle  these competing  views
of the role of unions and industrial  councils  in the South African  labor market. The first is the direct
effect of unions on workers' wages. A time honored question about the union wage gap is whether
it represents a true wage effect, or simply reflects the fact that workers who are in unions are
different from those who are not (c.f. Freeman and Medoff 1984). We address this selection issue
in two ways: first, we condition  on a variety  of covariates  (including  education,  industry,  occupation)
and estimate the union coefficient across households. Next, we estimate the union gap controlling
for household fixed effects. We find that among Africans, union members earn about 20 percent
more than nonunion workers, using either the across- or within-household estimates. The union
premium among Whites is about 10 percent.
Much of the policy debate in  South Africa hinges on whether the industrial council
agreements  force affected employers  to pay union wages for nonunion workers. Thus, the second
question we ask is whether there is evidence that such ergo omnes rules are binding and union
agreements  are extended to nonunion workers. We find evidence of an industrial council premium
on the order of 6-10 percent for African nonunion workers, suggesting that industrial council
agreements  do affect nonunion workers; the premium is positive but not statistically significant  for
Whites. Thus, the industrial council system is associated with higher wages for African nonunion
workers who are covered. However,  a sizeable  union wage gap persists within  the industrial council
sector suggesting that industrial councils do not create a situation where all workers covered by an
2  See Klasen and Woolard (1998) for a discussion of unemployment and the extent to which
workers support numerous household members.industrial council agreement receive the same compensation,  regardless of their union status. The
total premium earned by union members covered by industrial council agreements (the industrial
council premium plus the union premium) is similar to the union premium outside of the industrial
council sector. This suggests  that unions bargain  within the industrial council, which sets wages  that
are extended to all workers,  and then negotiate  for supplemental  awards at the plant level. The result
is that union members inside and outside the industrial council system receive similar wage
increases.  The industrial council and union wage gaps are largest for the least skilled group -
African laborers.
In the next section we discuss the collective bargaining environment in South Africa. In
section  III, we describe  the data and provide descriptive  statistics. Section IV presents our empirical
strategy. Section  V investigates  the union - nonunion income gap and the gap between those inside
and outside the industrial council sector. Section VI concludes with a discussion of the results.
II.  Industrial  Councils  in South  Africa
A.  Labor Market Regulation in South Africa
Three laws formed the basis for the major regulations governing the South African labor
market in the early to mid-1990s. These were the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA)
of 1983, the Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1956, and the Wage Act of 1957. These three laws
intersect,  and so anyone  involved  in setting labor  market minimum  standards  must consider  all three.
In general, agreements struck by industrial councils take precedence over minimum standardsguaranteed in the other provisions.  However, where no industrial council exists, workers are
typically covered by requirements contained  in the BCEA or the Wage Act (Standing, Sender, and
Weeks 1996).  Here we focus on industrial councils because  they are considered  the cornerstone  of
collective bargaining in South Africa and the other two wage setting acts are not considered to be
major sources of inflexibility  in South Africa (Standing, Sender, Weeks 1996).
B.  What Are Industrial Councils?
Although originally established  in 1924 as part of the Industrial Conciliation Act, industrial
councils today are governed by the regulations stemming from the Labour Relations Act of 1956
(previously  known as the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956).4 Industrial councils are established
when one or more registered employer associations voluntarily agree to bargain with one or more
registered trade unions (Bendix 1989, Standing, Sender, and Weeks 1996).  After agreeing on a
constitution,  which governs  the procedures  of the industrial  council, the interested  parties submit  an
application  to the Minister  of Manpower  to represent  a particular  area, industry,  trade or occupation.
The Minister then publishes a notice in the Government Gazette and invites objections to the
formation of the industrial council to be registered. At this time the Minister must also determine
whether the petitioners are "sufficiently  representative"  of the parties the industrial council intends
3  As Boccara and Moll (1997) note, however, a complete assessment of these laws would
consider the extent to which they discourage firms from operating at all.
4  Recent legislation, the Labor Relations Act of 1995, was designed to strengthen  centralized
bargaining (Standing, Sender, and Weeks 1996). This Act also renames Industrial Councils
"Bargaining Councils."  In this paper, however, we will refer to the more familiar term,
"Industrial Councils," as our data date from before the new legislation.to represent. Although the definition of "sufficiently  representative" is left to the discretion of the
Minister, it usually means that the parties represent the majority of employers or employees in an
area, industry,  occupation,  or trade. 5 Finally,  the Minister  determines  whether the industrial council
agreement will be extended to non-parties in the area, industry, trade or occupation for which the
industrial council is registered,  whether or not the employers  and employees are party to the council.
In order to extend the agreement  the Minister must be satisfied that non-extension would result in
"unfair competition" from employers not subject to the agreement (Bendix 1989).6
C.  Race and the Industrial Council System
In the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, which set up the industrial council system, only
employees  who belonged  to registered  unions were represented  in the industrial  council negotiations,
and the 1924  act excluded Africans from the definition  of employee. 7 Since Africans were formally
excluded as employees, their unions had no place at the industrial council bargaining table making
their unions "unregistered,"  although  not illegal  under civil law. In 1979,  the Industrial  Conciliation
5  For employers the question is whether a "majority" should be deterrnined  by a simple head
count, or weighted  by the number of employees. Before  the late 1980s,  the Minister seemed
to prefer the weighted count (such that it would suffice if 10 percent of employers  belonged
to  the industrial council and they represented more than  50 percent of  the relevant
workforce). More recently, the Minister has preferred a head count (Bendix 1989).
6  The Minister  can also extend some or all of the agreement  to employers and employees  who
are outside  of the jurisdiction for which the council is registered  (Bendix 1989 and Standing,
Sender, and Weeks 1996).
Technically, the original Act excluded "pass-bearing natives" from the definition of an
employee. Since  Black females and some African  men in the Cape were not obliged  to carry
a pass, they were covered by the legislation. However, the Labour Relations Act of 1956
excluded all "Bantu" including Black women from registration (Bendix 1989).Amendment Act extended the definition of employee to legal residents of the Republic of South
Africa. This excluded workers from the "independent"  homelands, such as Transkei, and the "non-
independent"  areas, such as Kwazulu. Thus for many years, the collective bargaining process for
White  South African workers was  highly centralized, while  that  for  African workers was
decentralized.
Increased African participation in the industrial council system began in the early 1980s
when the Labour  Relations Amendment  Act of 1981  removed race from the definition of employee.
Around this time, the many unregistered African unions were encouraged to register and begin to
work within  the existing  system. Nevertheless,  many  Afiican unions continued  to view the industrial
council system as allied with the older White unions and preferred to work outside the system.
Over the 1980s,  the African union movement gained strength and along with this increased
strength grew even greater support for participation in the industrial councils. At the 2nd  Congress
of African unions in April 1982, many of the larger unions pressed for a wider ranging form of
collective  bargaining, claiming that it would be more effective  than the plant-by-plant  strategy  that
had been followed to date. The Federation of South African Trade Unions - the largest federation
of independent trade unions at that time - agreed to participate in the industrial council system on
several conditions, among them: 1) workers should be able to join the union of their choice and 2)
industrial council bargaining should not preclude bargaining at the individual plants (International
Confederation  of Free Trade Unions). 8
8  That centralized bargaining should not preclude further bargaining at individual plants is a
fairly common occurrence  in other countries with centralized  collective bargaining, such as
Sweden  and Australia. In Australia,  for example,  unions often engage in establishment-level
bargaining after centralized agreements have been made.  At these establishment-level
bargaining  sessions, unions negotiate  for "overawards,"  which are wages and fringe  benefitsBy the early 1990s,  many African  trade unions were struggling  to have an industrial council
in their sector. As noted above, an industrial  council cannot be established  unless it would represent
a majority of workers in the registered area, industry, trade or occupation, and would represent a
majority of employers. This requirement  conveys substantial  power to groups of small employers.
For example,  in the early 1990s  the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWJU)  organized  the
contract cleaning sector and struggled with the National Contract Cleaners' Association (NCCA)
over the institution of an industrial council.  Although some of the larger contract cleaning
companies were in favor of the industrial council, because it would enforce wage agreements
throughout the industry and prevent their competitors  from undercutting  them, some of the smaller
companies were opposed (Keet 1992).  In fact, the Minister of Manpower was on the verge of
approving  an industrial  council when several of the companies  withdrew  their membership from the
NCCA. This withdrawal  prevented the Minister from approving the industrial council because the
NCCA no longer represented the contract cleaning sector nationwide.  Similarly, by 1994, some
employers were threatening to pull out of other major industrial councils, such as the Transvaal
Building Industry industrial council and the Motor Industry industrial council, because employers
claimed the industrial councils lacked flexibility. 9
above the levels set by the initial award (Kornfeld 1993). Further, an earlier literature on
"'wage drift"  was concerned about increases in the real  wage rate brought  about by
negotiations  (or other arrangements)  outside of the usual wage-setting  process. The problem
of wage drift has been more commonly found in countries with centralized collective
bargaining (see, for example, Brown (1962) for a nice overview of the literature).
9  According  to Von Holdt (1994),  the main complaints  by employers  centered  on the "...closed
shop provisions, the limited trading hours, and the rigid ratio clause, which specifies how
many non-artisans  may be employed for every artisan."D.  Industrial Councils Today
Although industrial councils form an important component of industrial relations in South
Africa, little empirical work has examined  their impact on compensation. 10 The main reason is that
the data on how many industrial councils exist and the number of workers  they cover are imprecise
and hard to come by. Standing, Sender, and Weeks (1996) cite Department of Labour data that in
1994, there were 81 industrial councils, covering about 1 million workers and 54,000 employers.
Seventy-eight of these councils covered all types of workers.  Ten were national in scope, 10
regional, 2 multi-regional, 38 sub-regional, and 21 local.  Thus, according to  their estimates,
industrial councils  cover only about 10 percent of the labor force and most of them are quite limited
in their geographic coverage.
In addition, as described in the introduction,  the value of the extension of industrial council
agreements  to non-parties  is hotly debated. Ninety  percent of the agreements  in 1994  had extensions
to non-parties  (Standing,  Sender, and Weeks 1996). The extensions  are designed  to insure minimum
wages (within  job  grade) and decent working conditions for workers and to shield participating
employers from competition by others who can offer lower wages and less generous benefits.'
Some believe  that the extensions  prevent wide-spread  exploitation  including low wages, long hours,
and unhygienic  conditions (Finnemore  and van der Merwe 1987). In addition, the extensions  help
to strengthen the employer associations and thereby maintain sectoral bargaining.  Without the
extensions employers could find themselves at a competitive  disadvantage and therefore conclude
10  See Moll (1995, 1996)  for a theoretical  model of the effect of industrial councils on wages.
I  t  More poignantly the extensions were designed  to protect White workers from competitionthat the costs of participating in the employer association outweigh the benefits. Critics argue that
the extensions  are particularly  burdensome  to small employers,  leading  to  closures and discouraging
start-ups,  and generally  interfere  with the normal  dynamics  of the labor  market (Moll 1996,  Standing,
Sender, and Weeks 1996).  12 A key question is, therefore, the extent to which these extensions are
binding.
One reason the agreements  may not be a major source of inflexibility in the South African
labor market is that exemptions from them are not uncommon. 13 At least 7 of the 81 industrial
councils in existence in  1994 had exemptions for small businesses (it was unclear whether an
additional  7 had exemptions). Of employers  subject  to an industrial council agreement, 17.3  percent
had applied for and been granted an exemption (most of which were exemptions from portions of
the agreement); 1.8 percent of employers had applied for an exemption and  been refused.
Interestingly,  large employers are more likely to apply for an exemption than are small employers
as about 35 percent of employers with more than 400 workers applied for one compared to only
about 12 percent of employers with 50 or fewer workers (Standing, Sender, and Weeks 1996).
Because of the exemptions, some workers may be compensated less than the amount set by the
industrial councils.  In addition, it is difficult to enforce the extension of the agreements to non-
parties.
A second contested issue is the extent to which unions conduct a second tier of bargaining
from African workers.
12  Katz  (1993) notes that in cases  where industry-wide  bargaining  "cartelizes"  the industry,  low-
cost competition is driven out of the market.
13  We note, however, that Boccara and Moll (1997) argue many employers are discouraged
from applying for exemptions fearing that it will lead to an "investigation" and that many
exemptions are for relatively minor policies such as the time of a tea break.at the plant level, generating  "recognition  agreements." While these agreements  generally  formalize
the relationship between the trade union and the particular employer and the industrial relations
procedures that will prevail at the plant, they can also negotiate over substantive issues, such as
wages (Bendix 1989). Many plant-level  negotiators  will attempt to improve the wages and working
conditions agreed upon at the industrial council level.  In fact, many unions argue that industrial
councils are mostly  concerned about the wages of skilled  workers while the unions at the plant-level
primarily represent unskilled and semi-skilled workers.  Therefore, at the plant level, union
negotiators  often focus on increasing the lowest wages and narrowing the wage gap between skilled
and unskilled  workers (Bendix 1989,  Finnemore  and van der Merwe 1987). Clearly this plant-level
negotiating would raise the wages of some workers above those set in the agreement.
The extent to which the "ergo omnes" rules are binding, and thus create inflexibility  in the
South  African labor market, and the extent of plant-level  bargaining  can be investigated  empirically.
However, in order to investigate this question, one needs microdata that indicates who is covered
by an industrial council agreement. Because no such data exist, researchers have used anecdotal
evidence or various proxies, such as defining an industry as being covered by an industrial council
agreement  if 50 percent of the workers in that industry  belong to a union or identifying  coverage  by
whether or not the worker receives particular benefits common to industrial council agreements
(Moll 1995, Moll 1996, Boccara and Moll 1997).  These proxies have a few drawbacks.  First,
nonunion workers  in heavily  unionized industries  may receive  higher wages and fringe  benefits even
in countries without a centralized collective bargaining system, if, for example, firms raise wages
and benefits in an effort to keep unions out (Rosen 1969).  Secondly, the "industries" covered by
industrial councils are actually  better described as "sectors" which are defined by a combination  ofoccupation, industry, and geography.  For example, in  1992 there was an industrial council
agreement  covering workers  in the retail meat trade in Witswatersrand  and Pretoria. (See Appendix
Table 1 for a list of industrial councils).
Fortunately,  it is possible to improve  on the identification  of industrial  council coverage. As
mentioned above, industrial  council agreements  are published  in the Government Gazette. Godfrey
(1992), in  his  Industrial Council Digest, surveys these primary  sources and  catalogs these
agreements.  His book describes the basic elements of the agreements,  the employers' associations
involved,  the union(s) involved, and the industries,  occupations,  and geographic regions affected  by
the agreements.  We used this excellent resource to define industrial council coverage based on
magisterial district of residence, and the most detailed industry and occupation codes available in
the October Household Survey.1
4 We then use this definition - which captures more than simple
union density  - to investigate whether the industrial council agreements are associated with higher
wages for nonunion workers.
If industrial councils operate as described  in Section II, there are several implications  for the
wage structure. First, workers who are nonunion members but are covered by industrial council
agreements should have higher wages than other similar nonunion workers. If industrial councils
are mostly concerned about wages of skilled workers, then we should see large industrial council
premia at the top, but not the bottom of the income distribution. In addition, we would expect to see
14  Of course, this definition  also has problems. The Digest details agreements  in place 3 years
prior to the collection of our data. While many agreements are simply renewed year after
year, we may have mis-classified some workers. In addition, while our definition is less
coarse than those used earlier, it is still the case that the data available in the October
Household Survey are not detailed enough to capture the precise descriptions in Godfrey's
Digest. The computer code used to define industrial council coverage is available from the
authors upon request.union premia within  the industrial  council sector  for workers  at the bottom of the income distribution
(or unskilled workers) if the unions that represent these,  workers are able to secure secondary
agreements  on a plant-by-plant basis.
III.  Data  and Descriptive  Statistics
Our data are from the October Household  Survey of 1995, a large annual survey conducted
by the Central Statistical Service (CSS). The survey is designed  to gather labor market information
for both the formal  and informal sectors,  as well as information  on births and deaths on over 130,000
individuals in over 29,000 households. For this sample,  we included African and White individuals
between the ages of 15 and 65.15  Our measure of income is gross monthly income. 16 We have also
used a measure of income that includes in-kind payments (such as food, shelter, clothing) which
generates  very similar results since  these payments  account for only about 1 percent of total income.
In this analysis, we include only those with non-missing monthly labor income.
In addition to providing a large sample, the October Household Survey also has detailed
industry categories  (there are 50 of them) and 3-digit occupation  codes.  We take advantage  of this
detail to construct a measure of which workers are covered by an industrial council. As described
1  5  We exclude Asians and Coloureds  from the analysis  because four-way  comparisons  are very
cumbersome and the sample sizes for Coloureds and Asians are relatively small. Broadly
speaking, the results for Coloureds and Asians fall between those for Africans and Whites
with Coloureds more similar to Africans and Asians more similar to Whites.
16  Some information is available on hours worked, but only the total number of hours worked
in the last seven days. Thus, it is not possible to create a reliable hourly wage measure for
most of the sample. When referring to our results we use the terms "income" and "wage"
interchangeably.above,  we identify industrial  council coverage  using the Industrial  Council Digest (Godfrey 1992).  17
According to our definition of industrial councils, approximately 16 percent of those who are
employed are covered by an industrial council agreement.' 8 In addition, 30 percent of workers in
the broad category of manufacturing  are covered (which is much lower than the 64 percent cited by
Moll (1993) for 1985)) as are 55 percent of workers in construction, and 19 percent of workers in
transportation. While mining is known as a sector with a strong union and high unionization  rates,
it has no industrial council. Similarly,  the teachers' union in South Africa is powerful, but cannot
have an industrial council by statute.
A significant disadvantage of the October Household Survey is that several magisterial
districts in KwaZulu/Natal  were not surveyed because they were considered too dangerous for the
survey teams.  The population in these areas is substantial (3 million), so the omission may be
important. The survey weights were calculated  to compensate for this problem (Simkins and Anmm
17  We do not count any workers in the mining and agriculture industries as being covered by
an industrial  council agreement,  even if their occupation  may be covered, as these industries
do not have industrial councils (agriculture is excluded by law).
18  It is difficult to get a straight-forward  estimate of the industrial council coverage rate from
the literature. Boccara and Moll (1997) report that 805,133 and 1 million employees were
covered by industrial council agreements  in 1993 and 1994, respectively. Simkins (1997)
reports the economically  active  population  (including  those seeking  work) in 1993 and 1994
was 12,320,000  and 12,694,000,  respectively. Combining  these figures with estimates  of the
South African unemployment rate (as high as 30 percent overall by some measures, and
higher for Africans, and African  women, in particular) gives estimates of industrial council
coverage on the order of 10 percent. Similarly,  Standing,  Sender and Weeks (1996) estimate
that about 10 percent of the labor force was covered by industrial councils. Our overall
estimate of the coverage rate is higher because our sample includes only those with reported
monthly income from regular employment  which is likely to include primarily the formal
sector of the labor market and our estimate excludes the unemployed.  In addition, to the
extent that the occupation  and industry  codes available in the October Household  Survey are
coarser  than those used to determine  actual  industrial  council coverage,  we will over-estimate
industrial council coverage.1997).  However, the fact that these workers are not represented must be kept in mind when
interpreting the results.
Tables la and lb provide simple summary  statistics for individuals, by union status. About
38 percent of the Africans belong to unions, compared to 24 percent of the Whites. The monthly
income measure shows that Africans earn much less than Whites, whether unionized or not.
Similarly, Africans have completed significantly fewer years of education than have Whites.
Although Whites are less likely to belong to unions than are African workers, they are more likely
to be covered by industrial council agreements, as would be expected given the history of these
institutions.
The data also show that union members earn substantially more than nonunion members.
Union members are also older, more likely to be married, and, among Africans, have completed
more years of education. This leads one to ask whether  these union-nonunion  differences  are simply
due to worker characteristics,  which the table demonstrates are different, or to an effect of unions.
We address this question below.
IV.  Empirical  Framework
We estimate the following equation:
log y, = a + X  b + gU, +e,
where log yj represents the natural logarithm of monthly income for individual i, Xi represents a
vector of individual  characteristics,  Ui indicates  whether  individual  i is currently  a member of a laborunion, and ei is a normally distributed error term. The coefficient  "g" represents  the percentage  gap
between union members and nonunion members, the union wage or income gap.
Whether "g"  represents the true union effect, the amount by which a randomly selected
individual's income would increase if moved from a nonunion to union job, is a debate of long-
standing in the large literature on union wage effects (c.f. Freeman and Medoff 1984). There are
several reasons to suspect that the measured gap is not the true effect of unions. Nonunion firms
may increase wages in order to thwart attempts at unionization (which would dampen the union
wage effect) (Rosen 1969); or because of employment spillovers from the union to the nonunion
sector,  wages may be depressed  in the nonunion sector  (which would increase the union wage effect)
(c.f. Lewis 1963). Furthermore, union workers may be different from nonunion workers as firms
attempt to select the most productive workers to compensate for the above-market-clearing  union
wage. As a result, union members may have skills, both observable and unobservable, that would
lead them to receive higher wages even in the absence of union representation.
While we cannot investigate what the nonunion wage would be in the absence of unions, we can
investigate  whether the union income gap is purely a matter of selection of better able individuals.
First, we control  for a variety of observable  covariates. Second,  we augment equation (1) to include
a household specific term which captures unobservable characteristics such as the fact that more
privileged households may be better connected  and have more information about the job market:
log y, = a + X,  b + gU  + hj +e
where the subscript i represents  the individual  andj represents  the household. Because households
in South Africa often include several related adults, we can estimate a model that includes ahousehold fixed-effect to control for unobservable  characteristics  that may be correlated with both
union membership and monthly income.  We then compare the across-household to the within-
household estimates. Once we have an (plausibly)  unbiased estimate of the union income gap, we
investigate the impact of unions and industrial councils.
We examine whether the wage agreements reached by industrial councils appear to affect
nonunion workers by estimating an industrial council premium. We also investigate whether these
agreements effectively cause workers to receive identical wages whether or not they are union
members by calculating the union gap for workers covered by industrial council agreements and
those not covered by estimating the following equation:
log y, = a'r+  X b+  d'IC, +  g'Ui  + c'(IC, x U) +ei
where IC 1 indicates  whether  the individual  is covered by an industrial council agreement,  and ICi'Us
is an interaction between industrial council coverage and union membership.  The coefficient d'
indicates whether nonunion workers covered by an industrial council agreement earn more than
similar nonunion workers who are not covered. We call this the industrial council premium. The
coefficient g'  estimates the union income gap among workers not covered by industrial council
agreements, g' + c'  indicates the union gap within the industrial council sector, and d' + g'  + c'
estimates  the "total" union premium for union members covered  by an industrial council agreement.
If d' is positive and statistically  significant,  this suggests  that industrial council agreements
are effectively extended to nonunion workers. If g' + c' is equal to zero then within the industrial
council sector union members earn the same wage as nonunion members, also indicating that the
agreements  are extended and that unions do not obtain supplemental awards. However, if g' + c'is positive and significant (and d' is also positive and significant)  then it appears that unions win
supplemental awards for their members at the plant level.  Finally, d' + g' + c' =  g' (or d' + c' =
0) suggests that unions attempt to win a certain wage increase for their members, irrespective of
industrial council coverage, and that those unions that also negotiate at the industrial council level
will supplement  those agreements  with plant-level  awards if necessary. Due to data limitations  (e.g.,
the fact that we would need within household variation  in union status and industrial council status)
we cannot estimate this equation using within-household variation.  To control for individual
characteristics  that may be correlated  with both union status and high wages, we include interactions
between indicator variables for education and occupation (at the 1-digit level).
V.  Union  Income  Gap
A.  Selection  Effects
Table 2a presents ordinary  least squares  (OLS) regression  results for log monthly income for
Africans. In column (1) we present the raw union wage gap, controlling for whether the worker is
female. Union workers earn approximately  62 percent more than nonunion workers.  1 9 However,
we know from the simple means that union workers have different observable characteristics  than
nonunion workers. Therefore, in column (2) we add controls for whether  the individual is the head
19  Throughout  this paper we primarily interpret the coefficient estimate on the union dummy
variable as the union income gap because we focus on estimates with smaller magnitudes.
For larger magnitudes,  the gap should  be calculated  as ex-I (Halvorsen  and Palmquist 1980).
In a few instances, we present this alternative calculation  in order to compare our results to
those reported by Schultz and Mwabu (1998).of the household, sex, a quadratic in age, years of education, years of education interacted with
whether the individual  completed any post-secondary  education,  whether the individual is married,
interactions  of these variables with sex, and province dummies. 20 These controls reduce the union
wage gap by almost one-half to 33 percent. This is still a very large premium, but clearly the fact
that union members are different (based on observables)  from nonunion members is responsible  for
a substantial amount of the raw union gap.
Union and nonunion workers also differ in their industrial and occupational distributions.
Some industries have extensive union coverage as do some occupations. For example, teachers in
South  Africa have a particularly  strong union. Therefore  the observed union wage gap of 33 percent
may actually be due to industry or occupation  effects. Column (3) includes occupation  dummies in
which occupation is measured at the 1-digit level. This lowers the estimated union gap slightly to
29 percent. Column (4) includes interaction terms for education and occupation; these results are
similar  to those in column (3) in which we allowed education  to vary by female. Finally, in columnn
(5) we add (1-digit) industry effects. Adding these controls decreases the estimated union gap to
about 18 percent, a magnitude similar to that estimated by Dabalen (2000).21
Before examining the rest of Table 2a, we turn to Table 2b.  This table presents similar
regressions for White workers.  Column (1) shows that union workers earn 13.7 percent higher
20  We combine women and men because F-tests indicated that the union gap does not differ
significantly  by sex, at least for Africans. If we estimate column (5) in Table 2a for women
the union wage gap is 0.207 and that for men is 0.  173; the corresponding  estimate for White
women is 0.133 and that for White men is 0.061.  The sex difference for Africans is not
statistically  significant; that for Whites is significant  at the 5% level. The estimated union
wage gaps using within-household variation by sex are of similar magnitude as those in
column (6) of Table 2a.
21  Controlling  for industry  is more important  than controlling  for occupation. If we only includemonthly income than do nonunion workers, before controlling  for other covariates. When we add
standard demographic controls, the union premium drops to 12.4 percent.  In columns (3)-(5) we
include occupation dummies (column 3), interactions  between education and occupation (column
4), and industry dummies (column 5).  Union workers  earn approximately 10-13  percent more than
nonunion workers.
In a recent and widely cited paper on unions in South Africa, Schultz and Mwabu (1998)
report that African workers in unions earn a 47 percent wage premium; White workers earn a 5
percent penalty.  In contrast, we estimate a 20 percent union premium for Africans and a 10-13
percent premium for Whites. 22 One reason for the differences  in our results is that their highlighted
estimates  do not control for the workers' industry and occupation. Researchers  typically control for
industry and occupation  when estimating  union wage gaps in order to more closely approximate  an
experiment in which randomly chosen workers are made union members without changing their
occupation  or industry. Once Schultz and Mwabu control  for industry  in their Table 5, they estimate
the union wage gap for Africans to be 19.1  percent, which is much closer to our estimate. However,
the results for Whites are quite different. In particular,  they estimate  that White union members earn
9.7 percent less than nonunion members (controlling  for industry effects in their Table 5).
A second potential  source of difference  between our results and those of Schultz and Mwabu
is that we use a measure of monthly income as the dependent variable whereas they use hourly
wages. We used the October Household  Survey because it has larger samples and better geographic
industry  effects the coefficient  in column (5) in Table 2a is 0.187 and that in Table 2b is 0.09.
22  As transformed by e%1, Schultz and Mwabu's estimates indicate a gap of 60 percent for
Africans and 5 percent for Whites. When our estimates are transformed, the union gap for
Africans is 22 percent and that for Whites is 11-14 percent.identifiers  which we need in order to conduct  our subsequent analysis. However, a drawback of the
October Household Survey is that it only contains information on hours worked last week, so we
cannot calculate an hourly wage measure. 23 On the other hand, while we cannot create an hourly
wage measure in the October Household Survey, we can create a monthly income using the same
data source as Schultz and Mwabu, the Living Standards Measurement Survey. 2 4 Appendix table
2 shows the union premia for several  different  definitions  of log hourly wage, and the corresponding
definition  of log monthly income. Regardless of the definition of income used, once industry and
occupation  controls  are included in the regression,  the union premium is nearly  identical whether  we
use an hourly wages or monthly income measures. For Africans, these results are also very similar
to those in our preferred specification  using  the October  Household  Survey log monthly income  data.
Thus, it is unlikely that our use of a monthly income as a dependent variable rather than hourly
wages explains the differences.
A third potential reason for the different results for Whites between the Living Standards
Measurement Survey in 1993 and the October Household Survey in 1995 is simply changes over
time in the union wage gap for Whites. Using the 1995 wave of the Living Standards Measurement
Survey and controlling for industry and occupation,  Dabalen (2000) estimates a union wage gap of
17.3 percent for Africans and 10.4 percent for Whites, which are quite similar to our estimates in
Tables 2a and 2b. And, while the wage gap for Africans appears to have been relatively stable for
the 1993 and 1994 waves of the Living Standards Measurement Survey as well, Dabelen estimates
23  When we control for hours last week in our log monthly income regression it takes a small
and insignificant coefficient, likely because it is measured with a great deal of noise.
24  These data are also referred to as the SALDRU data. They were collected by the South
African Labor and  Development Research Unit  at the  University of  Cape Town  inwage gaps of -6.9 percent and -3.7 percent in 1993 and 1994 (respectively)  for Whites. Overall,  we
conclude that our results differ from those reported by Schultz and Mwabu because of our controls
for industry and occupation (for Africans) and from changes over time in the union wage premium
(for Whites).
Although we have attempted to control for observable differences between union and
nonunion members,  unobservable  differences  may remain. As discussed  in the empirical framework
section,  if the unobservable  characteristics  are time invariant  and are shared by household members,
then we can account for the selection bias by including a household fixed-effect. 25 Returning to
Table 2a, column (6) shows the estimated union wage gap when we include a household specific
fixed-effect  in the regression. This specification  requires  that there is more than one worker in each
household,  and that some households  contain both union and nonunion  workers.  The estimated  union
wage gap of 20 percent for Africans is very close to the 18.4 percent estimated in column (5).
Similarly,  column (6) of Table 2b reports a within-household  union wage premium of 11 percent for
Whites which is also close to the cross-sectional  estimate presented  in column (5). In what follows,
we can only use across-household  variation in income to estimate the union and industrial council
wage gaps. The evidence in Tables 2a and 2b suggests  that this is (cautiously) justified as long as
we are careful to control for appropriate covariates. 26
collaboration with the World Bank.
25  Other techniques  for controlling  for selection  bias, such as the model suggested  by Heckman
(1979) are inappropriate  here as we do not have information  that predicts union membership
and could plausibly be excluded from the wage equation.  In the absence of such an
instrument, the Heckman correction is only identified off of functional form.
26  That said, we acknowledge  that the within-household  estimates  may suffer from other biases
due to family labor supply decisions which would generate differences between the subset
of households that supply our identifying variation (those with both union and nonunionBefore examining industrial councils, we estimate the union wage gap across the income
distribution. Schultz and Mwabu (1998) find that both African and White unions appear to reduce
inequality among their members as the union wage gap is largest for the lowest paid workers. In
fact, they highlight that the union wage premium for African male workers in the bottom decile of
the wage distribution is 145 percent compared to a premium of 19 percent for those in the top
decile. 27 These union wage premia, however, do not account for differences  in the occupations and
industries of union and nonunion workers.
We conduct a similar exercise by estimating the model in column (5) of Tables 2a and 2b
that controls  for industry effects as well as interactions  between education and occupation for each
quintile of a predicted wage distribution. 2 8 The results are in Table 3,29  For both Africans and
Whites we also find that the union income gap decreases (although not necessarily monotonically)
workers) and other households. We investigated whether the subset of households off of
which we are identified are representative of all households. For Africans, our identifying
variation comes from households with a higher fraction of females among the workers,
higher  average education  levels, and a higher fraction  of married adults. Among Whites,  the
identifying variation comes from households with a higher fraction female among the
workers, a higher fraction of married adults, and lower average education and average age.
There is no difference  in the average household income between the identifying  households
and other households for either Africans or Whites. These differences suggest that even the
within-household estimates may be too high for Africans and perhaps too low for Whites.
We note, however, that if we limit the regressions  in column (5) in Tables 2a and 2b to those
in households in which there is within-household variation in union status, the estimated
union gaps are about the same.
27  These percentages were calculated as eX-  1.
28  Appendix Table 3 shows the regressions  used to calculate in which quintile of the predicted
log income distribution workers fall.
29  It is important  to note that because of the very different  wage levels for Africans and Whites,
the predicted quintiles for the two groups  correspond to very different wages, as can be seen
in Table 3.as the predicted income of the worker increases. 30 In fact, the union wage gap among African
workers in the fourth and fifth quintiles are 14 percent and 7 percent respectively compared to a
premium  of between 19-33  percent  among  the lower quintiles.31  Among Whites  the premium  ranges
from 2-3 percent in the upper two quintiles and from 10-21 percent among the lower quintiles.
These patterns are consistent with those found by Schultz and Mwabu and suggest that unions
decrease inequality.
B. Industrial Council Coverage
As discussed above, one of the controversies  about  the effect of unions on the South African
labor market is the extent to which the industrial council system extends union wage agreements  to
all workers covered by that agreement  and the extent of plant-level supplemental bargaining. We
examine these questions, by estimating equation (3), in Tables 4a and 4b. 32
30  This pattern of a larger union wage gap at the lower end of the income distribution  holds for
women when we conduct the exercise separately by sex.  In particular, among African
women the union wage gap for the lowest quintle is 41 percent while that for the highest
quintile is a statistically  insignificant  3.9 percent; among White women the union wage gap
is 22.5 percent in the lowest quintile and a statistically insignificant 8.3 percent in the
highest.
31  Schultz and Mwabu's estimate of a union gap of 145 percent for African workers in the
lowest decile  has been transformed  by ex-1. For comparison,  our estimate would imply a gap
of 39 percent for the lowest quintile.
32  Because industrial council coverage largely depends on industry we cannot estimate our
preferred specification (column (5) of Tables 2a and 2b), therefore we use the specification
in column  (4).  To the extent that the more parsimonious  specification  inadequately  controls
for individual heterogeneity, the coefficients for both industrial council and union will be
overstated. Tables 2a and 2b suggest  the coefficients  will be overstated by about 60 percent
for Africans and 30 percent for Whites.The tables present  the industrial  council gap for nonunion workers,  the union gap outside  the
industrial  council sector,  and the union gap within  the industrial  council sector. If industrial  councils
extend wage agreements  to nonunion workers,  we expect a positive and significant  industrial council
coefficient. If all workers within the industrial council sector receive the same wage regardless of
their union status, we would expect to see no union premium within the industrial council sector.
In contrast, we would expect to see a union premium if a) industrial council agreements are not
extended to nonunion workers such that the industrial council premium is the union premium or b)
industrial council agreements are extended and unions pursue supplemental awards on a plant-by-
plant basis such that we would observe both an industrial council premium and a union premium. 33
The first column of each table shows the results for all workers. We observe that African
nonunion workers covered by an industrial council agreement earn about 10 percent more (or 6
percent more if adjusted, as noted in footnote 32) than those not covered by an industrial council
agreement and the difference is statistically significant.  In contrast, nonunion White workers
covered by an industrial council agreement  earn only about 2-3 percent more and the difference is
not statistically significant.  This provides some evidence that industrial council coverage is
associated with higher incomes for African nonunion members.  The union premium inside the
industrial council is smaller, but the total gap -- the industrial council premium plus the relevant
union premium -- is about 32 percent, which is not significantly different from the union gap for
33  Budd and Na (1999) conduct a similar exercise in the United States  by examining whether
there is a union premium for union members compared to workers who are covered by a
union contract,  but are not union members. Using Current  Population  Survey data, they find
evidence of such a premium and attempt to distinguish  among several potential reasons for
it. They find some support for the idea that union members and nonmembers  have different
human capital characteristics,  although  this does not fully explain the results. They also find
support for the notion that both employers and unions discriminate against nonmembers.workers not covered by industrial council agreements. This result suggests  that the unions to which
African workers belong target a particular wage increase, negotiate for a minimum wage standard
within the industrial council setting and then bargain for supplemental  awards to attain the targeted
wage increase for their members. For White workers the story is different. It does not appear that
the industrial council agreements are extended to White nonunion workers since the coefficient  on
industrial council coverage is statistically  insignificant and the union gaps are the same inside and
outside the industrial council sector. 34
As discussed above, the industrial councils originally covered workers in the types of jobs
represented by the White unions. As a result, they were typically more concerned about the wages
of skilled rather  than unskilled workers. We investigate  whether the industrial council wage premia
differ by the skill level of the worker in two ways. We begin by estimating the union and industrial
council premia by quintiles of the predicted wage distribution. If the industrial councils focus on
negotiating contracts for more skilled workers then we should observe a larger industrial council
premium in the top quintiles of the income distribution.
As shown in the remaining columns of Table 4a, the industrial council premium decreases
across the income distribution for African workers, from a high of 43 percent for the first quintile
to a low of a 21 percent penalty for quintile 5.  The union premia inside of the industrial council
sector are larger at the bottom of the wage distribution. It is worth noting, however, that workers
34  Unlike  the case for African  workers, it does not appear that the industrial council agreements
extend to nonunion members. Therefore,  we interpret the fact that the union wage gaps are
similar inside and outside of the industrial council sector differently. Here, we believe that
it does not  imply that the White union workers achieve supplemental awards at the plant
level. Rather, the union wage gap within the industrial council sector simply represents  the
gains made by the unions through the industrial council agreements.who are both in  industrial councils and belong to unions earn substantial wage premia. The
combined industrial council and union premia for workers  who belong to unions and are covered  by
industrial councils are statistically indistinguishable  from the union premia outside the industrial
councils.  The combined premia are also largest at the bottom of the wage distribution, once again
suggesting that in all sectors unions help equalize incomes between high and low skilled workers.
The results for Whites, in Table 4b, suggest  little or no industrial council premium and there
is no difference (statistically or economically)  between the union wage gaps inside and outside of
the industrial council sectors.
Some of these results square with perceptions of how industrial councils work and some do
not. On one hand, among Africans we find that the total premia for unionized workers in industrial
councils is about the same as the union premia for workers not covered by these agreements. We
interpret  this as evidence  that the unions are pursuing supplemental  awards on a plant-by-plant  basis
which accords with the demands put forth by African unions as a condition for agreeing to work
within the industrial councils.
On the other hand, among Africans we find  higher industrial council premia in the lower
income quintiles than in the upper quintiles, contrary to expectations; among Whites we find no
premium. This may have occurred  because  income quintiles  do not accurately  reflect the distinction
between skilled and unskilled  workers. Therefore,  we pursue a second strategy  for investigating  the
industrial councils:  we estimate our basic specification within three occupations: craft-persons,
operators, and laborers.  Not only are these three relatively large occupations where industrial
councils and unions have been particularly important, but crafts-persons are generally skilled
workers, operators semi-skilled, and laborers unskilled. About 35 percent of African workers areemployed as laborers, 17 percent as operators, and 10 percent as craft-persons.  Among White
workers about 2 percent are employed as laborers, 5 percent as operators, and 15 percent as crafts-
persons. Recall that historically industrial councils have been particularly important for (White)
craft-persons. Because our samples (once again) become smaller, we limit the controls included in
the regressions. In addition, note that within each occupation, the definition of who is covered by
an industrial council is determined solely from geography  and industry.
The top panels of Tables 5a and 5b present the results. Among Africans, for the operators
and laborers, those who are covered by an industrial council agreement but are not members of a
union earn about 17-35 percent more than nonunion workers who are not covered by an industrial
council, providing evidence that industrial council agreements  are extended to non-parties. While
the differences are large, the true industrial council premia are likely about sixty percent of these,
if the ratios between the within-household and across-household estimates (and between the
estimates in columns (5) and (4)) in Table 2a can be applied here. In addition, we observe that the
union gap is significantly  smaller among workers  who are covered by an industrial council. Again,
the total premium for union members covered  by industrial council agreements  is about  the same as
for union members  outside the industrial  council system. For African crafts-persons  and for Whites
(Table 5b) the results are somewhat  perplexing. There is no industrial council premium (contrary
to expectations) which suggests  that the agreements  do not extend to nonunion workers.  Before
concluding our investigation  of industrial councils,  we note that because industrial  council coverage
is so highly correlated with industry, we cannot include industry effects. One would like to know
whether imposing the industrial council system on a randomly chosen industry, occupation, and
geographic  area would generate  the patterns in income presented above. To investigate  whether  theindustrial council premium is mostly identifying  an industry effect, we estimated the specifications
in Tables 5a and 5b for crafts-persons, operators, and laborers for only those industries in which
there are some workers  covered by industrial councils  (manufacturing,  construction,  wholesale  trade,
restaurants  and hotels, transportation,  and public, domestic, and personal service). These results are
presented in the bottom panels of Tables 5a and 5b. In this case, only among African laborers  is the
industrial council coefficient positive and statistically  significant  at the 10 percent level. For craft-
persons and  operators, the industrial council premium is insignificant, as  it is  for all three
occupations among White workers.  This exercise is hampered by small sample sizes that make
inference difficult. Nevertheless, the results suggest that while industrial councils may operate in
high wage industries, there is still some evidence that industrial councils increase the wages of
nonunion workers, particularly among the least-skilled.
VI.  Summary,  Discussion,  and Avenues  for Future  Research
There is little doubt that unions in South Africa, like Solidarity in Poland, played a historic
role in the profound social, political, and economic  changes that transforned the country  in the last
few decades of the 20th Century. As the challenges facing the South African government change,
so too do questions  about the role of unions. The labor market in South Africa is criticized  for being
unduly rigid, placing a great burden on businesses,  stifling growth,  and exacerbating  unemployment.
Unions, with exceedingly  high wage premia, and industrial councils, which extend these premia to
nonunion workers are singled out as emblematic of the problem.
The heated public policy debate hinges on two questions.  Are the union wage premiaactually abnormally  high in South Africa? And, do industrial council agreements actually extend
these premia to nonunion workers?
The results in this paper suggest that while the union premia in South Africa are high, they
are not nearly as high as previous estimates would suggest.  Once we account for individual
heterogeneity, we estimate an average union premium on the order of 20 percent for African
workers; 10 percent for Whites. These estimates are roughly similar to estimates using data from
other countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom that attempt to control for
individual heterogeneity (Freeman and Medoff 1984).
Our results also shed some light on the question of whether the wages set by industrial
councils extend to nonunion workers. Overall, African nonunion workers covered by an industrial
council agreement appear to earn about 6-10 percent more than nonunion members not covered by
an agreement;  overall, there is no industrial  council premium for Whites. 35 In addition, although the
union premia inside the industrial council system are often significantly  smaller than those outside
the industrial council system, the total union premia inside the system (the industrial council
premium plus the union premium) tend to be similar to those outside the system.  These results
provide evidence  that industrial council agreements  are extended to non- union workers, and that
unions representing African workers negotiate for supplemental awards such that union workers
receive the same compensation whether or not they are covered by the industrial council system.
These results are an important step in understanding  what unions and industrial councils do
35  It is possible that our estimates  of the industrial  council effect are biased due to measurement
error. However,  because  our measure of whether  a worker is covered  by an industrial  council
is a categorical  variable,  the measurement  error is not classical such that one cannot sign the
direction of the bias (Aigner 1973).in the South African labor market.  Of course, one would like direct evidence on whether these
institutions cause businesses to fail, discourage small entrepreneurs from entering sectors covered
by industrial councils, and create barriers to employment. While a direct empirical investigation  of
these questions is beyond the scope of this paper, we may be able to give some insight into the last
question.
On the surface at least, the proportion of workers who are affected by industrial council
agreements is too small to be the primary reason for the vast unemployment numbers in South
Africa. Overall,  only about 10-16  percent of workers  are covered by industrial council agreements.
Operators and laborers - groups for whom we find the most evidence that industrial councils
extend  wage agreements  to nonunion  workers  - are about  26 percent of African  workers. However,
only about  13 percent of African operators and  laborers are covered by  industrial council
agreements.36
Second, the textbook prediction  that administratively  determined wages (such as minimum
wages) necessarily generate unemployment is based on competitive models of the labor market.
While the archetypal monopsony model (the company town) may not apply (although in some
sectors it may be a reasonable model), it is equally difficult to think of the sectors covered by
industrial  council agreements  in South  Africa as fitting the textbook model of a perfectly  competitive
labor market. The industrial council system was quite explicitly designed to minimize competition
among employers.  Recent work on  monopsony models in the labor market discuss how some
institutions  may foster collusive agreements  which give firms some market power. For example, in
36  We emphasize that this is only a partial equilibrium description - if another effect of the
industrial council system is to discourage  firms from operating in certain sectors this would
also reduce employment (Boccara and Moll 1997).his paper studying the market for nurses in the United States, Sullivan (1989) uses the example of
the  wide-spread "wage-standardization" programs adopted by  hospital  groups as  collusive
agreements that give hospitals monopsonistic characteristics.  It is possible that the industrial
councils perform a similar role for South African employers. They enforce wage standardization
agreements  which create monopsonistic characteristics  at the industry level. If industrial councils
create a monopsonistic environment, then employment and wages are lower than in a more
competitive setting.  Nevertheless, if monopsonistic rather than competitive models of the labor
market are applicable to South Africa, the policy implications are quite different.  To increase
employment,  policies should  focus on increasing  competition  among employers  within sectors,  rather
than increasing  competition among workers by attempting  to reduce union power. Future research
might fruitfully investigate the testable implications of monopsony in the South African labor
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Mean Individual Characteristics  by Race and Union Status
[standard  deviation]
Africans  Whites
Union  Non-Union  Union  Non-Union
0.285  0.313  0.295  0.449
Female  [0.452]  [0.464]  [0.456]  [0.497]
9.281  7.629  12.060  12.518
Years of Education  [3.892]  [4.277]  [1.763]  [1.919]
Years of Education xHigher  2.327  1.207  3.430  4.743
Education  [5.311]  [4.025]  [6.221]  [6.954]
38.350  36.569  36.577  36.405
Age  [9.447]  [10.598]  [10.365]  [11.416]
0.632  0.498  0.792  0.710
Married  [0.482]  [0.500]  [0.406]  [0.454]
0.627  0.575  0.683  0.520
Head of Household  [0.483]  [0.494]  [0.465]  [0.500]
Net Monthly  Income  1885  1243  4829  4416
(RAND)  [1229]  [1319]  [4044]  [4502]
Number of Observations
5350  10008  1204  4082Table lb
Union Membership and Industrial Council Coverage, by Racet
Africans
Not a Union Member  Union Member  Total
54.0  31.9  85.9
Not Covered by an  (62.8)  (37.2)  (100.0)
Industrial Council  [86.9]  [84.4]  [85.9]
8.2  5.9  14.1
Covered by an  (58.0)  (42.0)  (100.0)
Industrial  Council  [13.1]  [15.6]  [14.1]
62.1  37.9  100.0
(62.1)  (37.9)  (100.0)
Total  [100.0]  [100.0]  [100.0]
Whites
Not a Union Member  Union Member  Total
63.0  17.0  80.1
Not Covered  by an  (78.7)  (21.3)  (100.0)
Industrial  Council  [82.5]  [72.1]  [80.1]
13.3  6.6  19.9
Covered by an  (67.0)  (33.0)  (100.0)
Industrial Council  [17.5]  [27.9]  [19.9]
76.4  23.6  100.0
(76.4)  (23.6)  (100.0)
Total  [100.0]  [100.0]  [100.0]
Notes: These figures  are weighted. The sample includes  all individuals  aged 15-65  with non-missing  income.
tThe top percentage represents the cell  percentage, the percentage in parentheses represents the row
percentage, and the percentage  in brackets represents  the column percentage.
Source: Authors' calculations  using the 1995 October Household  Survey.Table 2a
Estimated Union-Non-union Log Monthly Income Gap for Africans
Within
Across Households  Households
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Union  0.616  0.329  0.293  0.292  0.184  0.204
(0.013)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.020)
Female  -0.006  -0.480  -0.436  -0.329  -0.376  -0.157
(0.014)  (0.148)  (0.139)  (0.136)  (0.127)  (0.164)
Head of Household  0.046  0.054  0.054  0.144  0.147
(0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.023)
Age  0.055  0.045  0.046  0.033  0.029
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)
Age
2 (  100)  -0.053  -0.043  -0.044  -0.032  -0.030
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.007)
Years of Education  0.083  0.058  0.013
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)
Years of Education x  0.029  0.011  0.007
Higher Education  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)
Married  0.184  0.147  0.148  0.104  0.023
(0.015)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.028)
Head of Household x  0.120  0.093  0.091  -0.006  -0.118
Female  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.046)
Age x Female  0.005  0.007  0.009  0.012  -0.003
(0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009)
Age
2 x Female (-  100)  0.005  -0.006  -0.010  -0.015  0.005
(0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011)
Years of Education x  0.028  0.013  0.005
Female  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)
Education x Higher  -0.001  0.002  0.009
Education x Female  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)
Married x Female  -0.121  -0.114  -0.105  -0.051  -0.062
(0.029)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.030)
Constant  6.737  4.792  5.350  5.828  6.210  5.901
(0.009)  (0.081)  (0.077)  (0.075)  (0.077)  (0.169)
Province Dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No
Occupation Dummies  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes
Occupation x Education:  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No
Industry Dummies  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes
Household Dummies  No  No  No  No  No  Yes
R
2 0.121  0.479  0.542  0.555  0.613  0.946
Number ofObservations  15358  15358  15358  15358  15358  15358Table 2b
Estimated Union-Non-union Log Monthly Income Gap for Whites
Within
Across Households  Households
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Union  0.137  0.124  0.132  0.128  0.096  0.110
(0.023)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.035)
Female  -0.578  0.537  0.354  0.332  0.362  0.884
(0.019)  (0.257)  (0.248)  (0.169)  (0.167)  (0.324)
Head of Household  0.322  0.305  0.316  0.293  0.114
(0.037)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.063)
Age  0.113  0.099  0.099  0.096  0.117
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.012)
Age
2 (  100)  -0.125  -0.110  -0.110  -0.107  -0.126
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.015)
Years of Education  0.156  0.115  0.067
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.017)
Years of Education x  -0.012  -0.011  -0.007
Higher Education  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)
Married  0.144  0.134  0.134  0.113  0.143
(0.031)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.075)
Head ofHousehold  x  -0.114  -0.106  -0.123  -0.110  0.050
Female  (0.055)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.052)  (0.113)
Age x Female  -0.032  -0.028  -0.028  -0.028  -0.045
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.013)
Age
2 x Female (-  100)  0.034  0.032  0.032  0.033  0.052
(0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.017)
Years of Education x  -0.012  -0.001  -0.023
Female  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.021)
Education x Higher  0.003  -0.001  0.005
Education x Female  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)
Married x Female  -0.084  -0.071  -0.068  -0.054  -0.106
(0.047)  (0.044)  (0,044)  (0.044)  (0.063)
Constant  8.349  3.659  4.481  5.850  6.007  5.004
(0.014)  (0.163)  (0.162)  (0.115)  (0.129)  (0.355)
Province Dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No
Occupation Dummies  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes
Occupation x Education,  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No
Industry Dummies  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes
Household Dummies  No  No  No  No  No  Yes
R
2 0.157  0.459  0.510  0.522  0.538  0.877
Number of Observations  5286  5286  5286  5286  5286  5286
Notes: The dependent  variable is  log (monthly income).  Standard errors are in parentheses.  All regressions are weighted.  All
regressions except for those in colunn  (I) include interactions between female and head of household, a quadratic in age, and marital
status. Columns (2) and (3) also include an interaction between female and years of education and years of education interacted with
whether completed any higher education.  The occupation and industry dummies are based on 1-digit occupation and industry codes.
There are 1580 individuals in households for which there is variation in union status (i.e., the households off of which the estimates
in column (6) of Table 2a are identified); there are 739 individuals in such households  in column (6) of Table 2b.Table 3
The Estimated Union-Non-union  Log Monthly Income Gap
by Predicted Wage Quintile, Using Across-Household  Variation,
Controlling for Occupation x Education Cells
Predicted Income Quintile
1  2  3  4  5
Africans
Union Gap  0.327  0.254  0.192  0.139  0.067
(0.029)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.020)
R  2  0.424  0.389  0.340  0.346  0.386
Range of Log(Income)  2.996  - 8.974  3.807  - 9.236  4.205  - 9.105  5.011  - 9.931  4.605  - 10.127
Number of Observations  3915  3446  2985  2517  2495
Whites
Union Gap  0.149  0.213  0.097  0.021  0.027
(0.046)  (0.046)  (0.039)  (0.035)  (0.040)
RB  0.269  0.266  0.245  0.280  0.322
Range of Log(Income)  4.477-9.249  2.303-10.195  5.572-9.732  4.007-11.109  5.991-11.607
Number of Observations  1175  1067  998  1144  902
Notes: The dependent variable is log (monthly  income).  Standard  errors are in parentheses.  All regressions include
a constant, female, the head of the household a quadratic in age, marital status, 1-digit industry dummies, province
dummies, interactions between occupation  and education, and interactions between female and head of household, a
quadratic in age, and marital status.  The occupation  x education dummies  are based on 1-digit  occupation  codes.  All
regressions are weighted.  The regressions in this table are analogous  to those in column (5) of Tables 2a and 2b.
Source:  Authors' calculations using the 1995 October Household Survey.Table 4a
The Estimated Union-Non-union  Log Monthly Income Gap for Africans
by Industrial Council Coverage and Predicted Wage Quintile, Using Across-Household Variation
Predicted Income Quintile
Overall  1  2  3  4  5
Industrial Council Wage Gap for  0.101  0.430  0.128  0.030  0.008  -0.202
Non-union Workers  (0.0  19)  (0.043)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.051)
Union Gap, Outside of Industrial  0.305  0.606  0.439  0.291  0.189  0.071
Council Sector  (0.011)  (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.020)
Union Gap, Inside of Industrial  0.224  0.260  0.319  0.294  0.193  0.195
Council Sector  (0.025)  (0.078)  (0.056)  (0.053)  (0.051)  (0.062)
p-value of Difference Between
Union Gap Outside of Industrial
Council Sector and Total Union Gap
Inside of Industrial Council Sectort  0.339  0.257  0.870  0.454  0.769  0.088
R2  0.556  0.333  0.278  0.243  0.261  0.367
Proportion Unionized  0.379  0.165  0.309  0.399  0.471  0.549
Proportion in Industrial Council  0.141  0.101  0.147  0.177  0.180  0.098
Sector
Number of Observations  15358  3915  3446  2985  2517  2495Table 4b
The Estimated Union-Non-union  Log Monthly Income Gap for Whites
by Industrial Council Coverage and Predicted Wage Quintile, Using Across-Household Variation
Predicted Income Quintile
Overall  1  2  3  4  5
Industrial Council Wage Gap for Non-  0.028  0.005  0.083  -0.001  -0.001  0.034
union Workers  (0.023)  (0.051)  (0.057)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.055)
Union Gap, Outside of Industrial  0.124  0.189  0.258  0.136  0.055  0.005
Council Sector  (0.021)  (0.052)  (0.051)  (0.045)  (0.040)  (0.046)
Union Gap, Inside of Industrial  0.134  0.177  0.284  0.157  0.113  0.051
Council Sector  (0.035)  (0.089)  (0.097)  (0.076)  (0.066)  (0.075)
p-value of Difference Between Union
Gap Outside of Industrial Council
Sector and Total Union Gap Inside of
Industrial Council Sectort  0.253  0.945  0.263  0.787  0.358  0.277
R2  0.523  0.248  0.225  0.205  0.224  0.284
Proportion Unionized  0.236  0.167  0.203  0.256  0.302  0.253
Proportion in Industrial Council  0.199  0.186  0.178  0.205  0.215  0.212
Sector
Number of Observations  5286  1175  1067  998  1144  902
Notes: The dependent variable is log (monthly income).  Standard  errors are in parentheses. All regressions include
a constant, sex, a quadratic in age, head of household, or married, interactions between sex and these 4 variables,
province dummies, and dummy variables indicating interactions  between education and occupation.  The regressions
are weighted. See text for the determination  of industrial  council coverage.
t The Total Union Gap Inside of Industrial Council Sector includes both the Industrial Council Wage Gap and the
Union Gap Inside of the Industrial Council Sector.
Source: Authors' calculations  using the 1995 October Household Survey.Table 5a
The Estimated Union-Non-union Log Monthly Income Gap for Africans
by Industrial Council Coverage for Selected Occupations
Occupation
Craft  Operators  Laborers
All Industries
Industrial Council Wage Gap for Non-union Workers  -0.039  0.173  0.352
(0.041)  (0.041)  (0.039)
Union Gap, Outside of Industrial Council Sector  0.251  0.348  0.482
(0.041)  (0.027)  (0.020)
Union Gap, Inside of Industrial Council Sector  0.133  0.138  0.196
(0.055)  (0.049)  (0.054)
p-value of Difference  Between Union Gap Outside of
Industrial Council Sector and Total Union Gap Inside of
Industrial Council Sectort  0.005  0.354  0.113
R  2  0.3  17  0.336  0.385
Proportion Union  0.422  0.474  0.255
Proportion in Industrial Council Sector  0.405  0.223  0.085
Number of Observations  1513  2378  5854
Industries with Any Industrial Council Activity:
Industrial Council Wage Gap for Non-union Workers  0.029  -0.039  0.072
(0.050)  (0.040)  (0.041)
Union Gap, Outside of Industrial Council Sector  0.294  0.161  0.270
(0.058)  (0.032)  (0.029)
Union Gap, Inside of Industrial Council Sector  0.131  0.172  0.216
(0.057)  (0.046)  (0.052)
p-value of Difference  Between Union Gap Outside of
Industrial Council Sector and Total Union Gap Inside of
Industrial Council Sectort  0.037  0.474  0.673
R  2  0.319  0.291  0.296
Proportion Union  0.343  0.511  0.425
Proportion in Industrial Council Sector  0.0567  0.323  0.222
Number of Observations  1047  1502  1932Table Sb
The Estimated Union-Non-union Log Monthly Income Gap for Whites
by Industrial Council Coverage for Selected Occupations
Occupation
Craft  Operators  Laborers
All Industries
Industrial Council Wage Gap for Non-union Workers  -0.009  -0.172  0.204
(0.048)  (0.097)  (0.227)
Union Gap, Outside of Industrial Council Sector  0.198  0.190  0.528
(0.051)  (0.100)  (0.172)
Union Gap, Inside of Industrial Council Sector  0.124  0.144  0.214
(0.057)  (0.131)  (0.310)
p-value of Difference Between Union Gap Outside of
Industrial Council Sector and Total Union Gap Inside of
Industrial Council Sectort  0.159  0.105  0.687
R2 0.395  0.522  0.495
Proportion Union  0.414  0.326  0.227
Proportion in Industrial Council Sector  0.447  0.324  0.156
Number of Observations  758  234  143
Industries with Any Industrial Council Activityl
Industrial Council Wage Gap for Non-union Workers  0.041  -0.151  0.187
(0.060)  (0.099)  (0.287)
Union Gap, Outside of Industrial Council Sector  0.210  0.216  0.451
(0.083)  (0.120)  (0.353)
Union Gap, Inside of Industrial Council Sector  0.113  0.157  0.090
(0.062)  (0.131)  (0.347)
p-value of Difference Between Union Gap Outside of
Industrial Council Sector and Total Union Gap Inside of
Industrial Council Sectort  0.503  0.152  0.610
R2 0.419  0.574  0.661
Proportion Union  0.338  0.300  0.263
Proportion in Industrial Council Sector  0.629  0.382  0.315
Number of Observations  505  196  62
Notes:  The dependent variable is log (monthly income).  Standard errors are in parentheses.  All regressions include
a constant, sex, a quadratic in age, whether head of household, or married, interactions between these variables and sex,
and education and province dummies. The regressions are weighted.  See text for the determination of industrial council
coverage.
t  The Total Union Gap Inside of Industrial Council Sector includes both the Industrial Council Wage Gap and the Union
Gap Inside of the Industrial Council Sector.
+ Only workers employed  as craft-persons, operators,  and laborers in the manufacturing,  construction,  wholesale,
restaurant and hotel, transportation, or public, domestic, and personal service industries are included.
Source:  Authors' calculations using the 1995 October  Household  Survey.Appendix Table I
A Listing of Industrial Councils (Based on Godfrey (1992))
Industrial Council for the Cinematograph  and Theatre Industry
Industrial Council for the Diamond Cutting Industry
National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering  and Metallurgical Industry (NICISEMI)
Industrial Council for the Leather Industry
Industrial Council for the Motor Industry
Ophthalmic  Optical Manufacturing Industry
Industrial Council for the Textile Manufacturing  Industry
Industrial Council for the Building Industry (East London)
Industrial Council for the Building Industry (East Cape)
Industrial Council for the Building Industry (Kimberley)
Industrial Council for the Building Industry (Kroonstad)
Industrial Council for the Building Industry (Pietermaritzburg  and Northern Areas)
Industrial Council for the Building Industry (Port Natal)
Industrial Council for the Building Industry (Western Province)
Industrial Council  for the Building Industry (North and West Borland)
Industrial Council for the Building and Monumental Masonry  Industry (Bloemfontein)
Industrial Council for the Building and Monumental Masonry  Industry (Transvaal)
Industrial Council for the Clothing Industry (Cape)
Industrial Council for the Clothing Industry (Eastern Province)
Industrial Council for the Clothing Industry (Natal)
Industrial Council for the Clothing Industry (Orange Free State and Northern Cape)
Industrial Council for the Knitting Industry (Transvaal)
Industrial Council for the Electrical Contracting and Servicing Industry (Cape)
Industrial Council for the Electrical Contracting Industry (Transvaal)
Industrial Council for the Electrical Industry (East London)
Industrial Council  for the Electrical Industry - Electrical Contracting Section (Natal)
Industrial Council  for the Furniture Manufacturing  Industry (Border)
Industrial Council for the Furniture Manufacturing  Industry (Eastern Cape Province)
Industrial Council for the Furniture Manufacturing  Industry (Natal)
Industrial Council  for the Furniture Manufacturing  Industry (Orange Free State)
Industrial Council  for the Furniture Manufacturing  Industry (South Western Districts)
Industrial Council  for the Furniture Manufacturing  Industry (Western  Cape)
Industrial Council for the Furniture and bedding Manufacturing  Industry (Transvaal)
Industrial Council for the Hairdressing  Trade (Border)
Industrial Council  for the Hairdressing Trade (Cape Peninsula)
Industrial Council for the Hairdressing  Trade (Natal)
Industrial Council for the Hairdressing  Trade (Pretoria)
Industrial Council for the Hairdressing  Trade (Port Elizabeth)
Industrial Council for the Hairdressing  Trade (Southern and Western Transvaal)Industrial Council  for the Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Industry (Cape)
Industrial Council  for the Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Industry (Natal)
Industrial Council for the Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Industry (Transvaal)
Industrial Council for the Liquor and Catering Trade (Cape)
Industrial Council for the Liquor and Catering Trade (Pietermaritzburg)
Industrial Council for the Liquor and Catering Trade (South  Coast, Natal)
Industrial Council for the Liquor, Catering, and Accommodation  Trade (Border)
Industrial Council for the Motor Transport Undertaking  (Goods)
Industrial Council for the Sugar Manufacturing  and Refining Industry
Industrial Council for the Grain Co-operative Trade (not yet published agreement)
Industrial Council for the Contract Cleaning Industry (not yet published agreement)
Industrial Council for the Biscuit Manufacturing  Industry
Industrial Council for the Canvas and Ropeworking Industry
Industrial Council for the Canvas Goods Industry
Industrial Council  for the Chemical Industry
Industrial Council  for the Commercial Distributive Trade
Industrial Council  for the Jewellery and Precious Metal Industry
Industrial Council for the Meat Trade
Industrial Council for the Millinery Industry (Cape)
Industrial Council  for the Millinery Industry (Transvaal)
Industrial Council for the New Tyre Manufacturing  Industry
Industrial Council for the Passenger Transportation  Trade
Industrial Council for the Retail Meat Trade (Witwatersrand)
Industrial Council for the Retail Meat Trade (Pretoria)
Industrial Council for the Road Passenger Transport Industry (Port Elizabeth)
Industrial Council for the Storekeeping  Trade
Industrial Council for the Sweetmaking  Industry (Cape)
Industrial Council for the Sweetmaking  Industry (Johannesburg)
Industrial Council for the Tearoom, Restaurant  and Catering Trade (Pretoria)
Industrial Council for the Tearoom, Restaurant  and Catering Trade (Witwatersrand)
Industrial Council for the Worsted Textile Manufacturing Industry
Industrial Council for the Local Government Undertaking
Industrial Council for the Local Authority Undertaking of the Cape of Good Hope
Industrial Council for the Local Authority Undertaking of Kimberley
Industrial Council for the Bloemfontein  Municipal Undertaking
Industrial Council for the OFS Goldfields Local Authority
Industrial Council for the Pretoria Municipal Undertaking
Industrial Council for the Johannesburg Municipal  Undertaking
Industrial Council for the Municipal Undertaking of Port ElizabethAppendix Table 2
Estimated  Union-Non-Union  Wage/Income  Gap  for Africans  and  Whites,
Using the 1993 Living Standards  Measurement  Survey
Africans  Whites
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Log Hourly Wage,  net of taxes, including benefits & profit sharing
Union  0.463  0.170  0.178  -0.121  -0.113  -0.117
(0.033)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.052)  (0.054)  (0.054)
Log Monthly Income, net of taxes, including benefits & profit sharing
Union  0.339  0.146  0.154  -0.143  -0.094  -0.093
(0.024)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.048)  (0.050)  (0.050)
Log Hourly Wage, gross of taxes, including  benefits & profit sharing
Union  0.550  0.232  0.240  -0.037  -0.031  -0.050
(0.034)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.052)  (0.055)  (0.054)
Log Monthly Income, gross of taxes, including  benefits & profit sharing
Union  0.426  0.208  0.216  -0.060  -0.011  -0.026
(0.025)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.051)
Log Hourly Wage, gross of taxes, including benefits, profit sharing, and in-
kind payments
Union  0.558  0.248  0.255  -0.043  -0.037  -0.056
(0.033)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.053)  (0.055)  (0.055)
Log Monthly Income, gross of taxes, including  benefits, profit sharing, and in-
kind payments
Union  0.433  0.224  0.231  -0.065  -0.018  -0.031
(0.024)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.050)  (0.052)  (0.051)
Occupation Dummies  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No
Occupation  x Education  Dummies  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes
Industry Dummies  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes
Notes:  All regressions  include a constant and are weighted.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. The regressions in
columns  (1) and (4) include controls for: female,  head of household,  age, age squared,  married,  years of education, years
of education interacted  with whether  completed  any higher  education, interaction  between all of these and female,  urban
residence, 9 province dummies,  an indicator  for whether the individual  is the respondent, and for whether the individual
is a usual resident of the household. Columns (2) and (5) include these same controls and add indicators for industry
and occupation. Columns  (3) and (6) include similar  controls except that instead of controlling for a spline in education
and occupation dummies separately, interactions  between years of education and occupation are included.  There are
4251 observations in the regressions for Africans and 1230 observations  in the regressions for Whites.
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using the 1993 Living Standards  Measurement  Survey.Appendix Table 3
Log Monthly Income Equation Used to Determine  Income Quintiles
Africans  Whites
Female  -0.835  0.555
(0.229)  (0.591)
Years of Education  0.088  0.143
(0.008)  (0.029)
Year of Education x Higher Education  0.035  -0.018
(0.003)  (0.004)
Age  0.060  0.115
(0.006)  (0.012)
Age, squared (.  100)  -0.059  -0.137
(0.007)  (0.012)
Years of Education x Age (.100)  0.009  0.086
(0.019)  (0.061)
Head of Household  0.042  0.325
(0.023)  (0.052)
Married  0.211  0.156
(0.021)  (0.045)
Years of Education x Female  0.045  0.003
(0.014)  (0.045)
Years of Education x Higher Education  x Female  0.001  0.008
(0.004)  (0.006)
Age x Female  0.021  -0.038
(0.011)  (0.019)
Age2 x Female (.  100)  -0.020  0.050
(0.013)  (0.017)
Years of Education x Age x Female (  100)  -0.049  -0.055
(0.035)  (0.099)
Head of Household x Female  0.137  -0.137
(0.038)  (0.073)
Married x Female  -0.151  -0.109
(0.035)  (0.063)
Constant  4.667  3.624
(0.122)  (0.381)
Province Dummies  Yes  Yes
R'  0.470  0.459
Number of Observations  8840  3390
Notes: The dependent variable is log (monthly income).  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Both regressions also
include a constant and are weighted. The samples include only non-union workers (both men and women)  not covered
by an industrial  council agreement.
Source: Authors' calculations using the 1995 October  Household Survey.Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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